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**Culture, Conflict and Community: Rituals of Protest or
Flairs of Competition**

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Background

Works of artistic and cultural expression have been celebrated, censored, deplored and debated since the beginning of Western Civilization. Cultural achievements have long been identified as sources of moral uplift, symbols of status and refinement, the basis for civic identity, and the expression of collective values. The arts have also been the source of bitter conflict and the target of political and ideological passions ever since the Old Testament proclaimed, “Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image.”

Over the years, Americans have, more or less, successfully navigated this cultural sea, tossed between waves of outrage and approbation over artworks and cultural expression that both challenge and affirm notions of public morality, decency, shared values and beauty. Recently, the pitch and intensity of these debates seem to have risen as art and cultural expression have been depicted on the front pages of our newspapers as sources of conflict over the boundaries of permissible expression in American communities.

Conservative politicians and religious leaders have asserted that the United States is in the midst of a serious moral decline and have targeted artists, entertainment executives, journalists, librarians and institutions like the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) as both causes and symptoms of this decline. On the left, civil libertarians, arts advocates and scholars have responded by labeling critics as philistines and censors and arguing that the First Amendment is being threatened as never before.

Many have explained the rise of conflict over the arts and culture as a symptom of a cultural establishment – from the avant-garde to Hollywood – that increasingly produces images and presentations that challenge middle-class values (Dubin 1992; Heins 1993; Crane 1987; Bell 1996). Unfortunately, explanations of conflict that focus on the unnerving content and style of modern and postmodern art tend to be tautological, concluding that “provocative art leads to provocation.” This formulation is neither interesting nor theoretically useful. Moreover, such a theory cannot account for the fact that many seemingly benign artistic projects still raise unexpected controversy (Tepper 2000; Hartocollis 1994; Senie 1992).

Some scholars, however, have attempted to get beyond the nature of the artwork itself in an attempt to understand the social conditions underlying the apparent rise in conflict over art and culture. They trace such conflicts to more broad-based struggles between conservative and evangelical Christians and liberal, secular humanists (the cultural elite) over the values that

define America (Bolton 1992; Doss 1995; Dubin 1992; Peter and Crosier 1995; Romanowski 1996). In his debate-defining book, *The Culture Wars*, James Davison Hunter (1991) describes the division between orthodox and progressive forces in the United States as "a fairly comprehensive and momentous struggle to define the meaning of America" (49). Stephen Dubin (1992) and Todd Gitlin (1995) also contend that current battles over art and culture are not simply political diversions, but rather reflect more serious underlying tensions and cultural divisions in society.

Unfortunately, most of the studies that advance theories about the social conditions of cultural conflict draw their conclusions by examining high profile case studies. Such studies focus on the unique and varied confluence of factors that come together in a particular time and place and create sparks and often full-blown fires around an artistic or cultural work. However, unless researchers look at many communities side-by-side, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions about links between the presence of conflict and certain underlying social conditions. The research reported here goes beyond single case studies and compares 48 communities in an effort to understand *why some communities are more contentious than others when it comes to fighting over art and cultural expression*.

Methodology

What is a cultural conflict? It is worth clarifying at this point what is meant by a conflict over artistic and cultural expression. In the present study, a conflict involves an action or grievance against the content of an artistic presentation (murals, plays, books, sculptures, fine arts exhibitions, television programs, movies, popular music, and poetry) or an educational or interpretative exhibition, such as an historical exhibit at a school or public library or a documentary film. Grievances can be directed at commercial, nonprofit, school or government funded presentations. Challengers to cultural presentations may include individual citizens, nonprofit groups, or elected officials. While all conflicts involve an initiating action against a cultural presentation (public demonstration, petition, banning, or letter-writing campaign), not all conflicts will necessarily involve defenders of the work in question. Finally, in order for a conflict to be considered in this analysis, it must be reported in the local press. The above definition is, in large measure, derived from DiMaggio et al.'s study of Philadelphia-based conflicts (1999).

What is the unit of analysis? As mentioned above, rather than compare individual conflict events, this study takes the metropolitan statistical area as its unit of analysis. Forty-eight metropolitan statistical areas were selected for this stage of the study. This represents a random sample within a truncated universe of possible cities. Because this study relies on the use of electronic newspaper search engines (*Lexis-Nexis*, *Dow Jones* and *Dialog*), the population of cities includes only those where a daily newspaper was available online and in full-text during the time periods under investigation (1995-1998).¹ The final sample includes cities ranging in size from Chicago with over seven million residents to Springfield, Illinois with a population just under 175,000. The sample is also geographically diverse, ranging from cities in the Northeast to the South, Southwest, Midwest, and Pacific regions of the country.

Sources of data. Drawing on the work of Charles Tilly (1995), Doug McAdam (1982), Susan Olzak (1989) and others, this research draws exclusively on newspaper reports to identify cases of conflict in each of the forty-eight metropolitan areas. In cities with two major papers, I chose the one with the larger circulation. Following a method developed by Paul DiMaggio et al. (1999) to study the incidence of public conflict over the arts in Philadelphia from 1965 to 1998, I relied on a complex search algorithm that included both "art and culture" words (artist, sculpture, dance, music, film...) as well as "protest" words (conflict, outrage, protest, petition, censor...) in order to identify stories related to controversies over cultural expression.²

The primary aim of this research is to explain variation in the number of conflicts experienced in American cities from 1995 through 1998. In some respects we might think of this as the rate of conflict in each city --- a city might have twelve conflicts every four years (or three per year), or five conflicts every four years. Overall, research assistants scanned more than

¹ Not every newspaper was available on all three online databases, so in order to maximize the sample size, I used all of them – *Nexis*, *Dow* and *Dialog*. To rule out possible bias introduced by using one or the other of the three available instruments, I conducted separate searches of the same city with all three devices. While I found minor differences in the number of articles retrieved by each, I concluded that the inter-instrument reliability was quite high, diminishing the chance that any systematic bias was introduced by using one or the other of the electronic databases.

² The final algorithm used in the *Lexis-Nexis* search was as follows: "date is ___ and ((art or artist or artw! or ballet or choir or cine! or concert or danc! or exhibit or film or gallery or lyric or hip hop or librar! or monument or movie or mural or museum or music or novel! or painting or photograph or playw! or poem or poet or porn! or rap or sculpture or song or smut or statue or tel! prog! or theater or video) w/20 (ban or banned or banning or boycott! or censor! or conflict or controvers! or demonstrator or dispute or free! expres! or injun! or objected or obscen! or outcry or outrage or outraged or petition or protest or pub! hear! or rall! or remove or removal or restrict or restriction)) or ((book w/10 ban or bann! or censor! or protest or remov! or restr!)) and not section(spo! or trav! or obit!) and not byline(assoc! or serv!) and not dateline(wash! or new york!).

100,000 headlines, carefully reviewed over 2,500 newspaper articles and coded more than 525 cases of conflict.

Models. In addition to examining the number of conflicts over a four year period, I also examine variation between cities in terms of the types of grievances expressed against a cultural works. In particular, each conflict is characterized as having a liberal, conservative or neutral valence (DiMaggio et al. 1999). Liberal valence refers to those grievances against cultural presentations made on the grounds that they are offensive to women, ethnic minorities or non-Christians and religious dissenters. Conservative valence refers to grievances against artworks deemed blasphemous, obscene, violent, or otherwise vulgar. Neutral valence events are those where challengers feel the artwork is simply unsightly, a waste of money or just not appropriate for the community. At the aggregate level, for some models, the dependent variable becomes the *total number of conservatively-based events* in the community and *the total number of liberal-based events*.

Finally, I seek to explain variation in the “contentiousness” of each MSA by regressing the total number of conflicts (or the total number of either liberal or conservative conflicts) against demographic characteristics of each city, including the log of the population; the percent of residents with some college education; the degree of racial heterogeneity³; the percent change in the size of the population; the percent change in the proportion of foreign-born residents; and the percent change in the proportion of single-parent households.⁴

Hypotheses

Social Change and Group Competition

Over the last thirty years scholars have examined the process by which social change generates conflict. Those who adopt the political economy model of social conflict argue that population changes lead to competition between groups -- new and old immigrants, blacks and whites, native and foreign-born -- over such political and economic resources as representation in

³ Racial heterogeneity is measured using the Gibbs-Martin Index which describes the extent to which a population is evenly divided among relevant categories – in this case white, non-Hispanic; black, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; other races, non-Hispanic.

⁴ When the dependent variable is an event count, as in the case of my study, then the assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares regression do not hold. In such cases Poisson regression and the negative binomial regression techniques are recommended. For all models presented here, both of these techniques were used, in addition to OLS. In every case I found that neither the Poisson nor the negative binomial provided a better fit for the data, nor were the strength and direction of my coefficients different. Therefore, I present findings using the OLS models for ease of interpretation.

government (elections), housing, and jobs. Such competition might find outlets in strikes, urban riots, civil rights protests, or racial violence (McVeigh 1999; Myers 1997; Shanahan 1999; Soule 1999).

Others have focused on the relationship between social change and competition over cultural and symbolic resources (as opposed to economic and political resources).⁵ From this perspective, social change leads to widespread uncertainty about the dominant values in a community. Will drunkenness or temperance prevail? Abstinence or promiscuity? Respect for parents and teachers or rebellion and disrespect? Fidelity or divorce? Patriarchy or women's liberation? Religious or secular values? Traditional family structure or tolerance for gay and lesbian lifestyles? Thus, in times of uncertainty, groups of citizens compete with each other in an effort to define and control the symbols and cultural expression that communicate the values of their community. They compete over whose message is seen and heard in the press, whose books are available in schools and libraries, whose monuments are in the public park, whose flag flies over the county courthouse, and whose language appears on traffic signs.

Securing scarce symbolic resources brings many advantages to the winners including prestige and status. If temperance emerges as a cherished value in a community, then those who are temperate will be more highly regarded than those who are not. As Gusfield (1962) shows, this was precisely the strategy used by middle-class reformers in the nineteenth century to distinguish themselves from the behavior and lifestyle of newly arrived Catholic immigrants. Similarly, if opponents of pornography are successful in painting allegedly obscene materials as pernicious, then those who consume and sell such material become pariahs in a community, while those who fight against it become heroes and honored citizens (Zurcher 1976). In summary, in the midst of dramatic demographic shifts, citizens fight over symbolic resources, such as artistic expression, in order to legitimate new or established values, cultural preferences and lifestyles.

Thus, when examining the cities in my sample, I expect that conflicts should arise in those places where established citizens feel threatened by new and different lifestyles. Many scholars have written about the social unease created by the influx of new immigrant groups into

⁵ Such work draws upon Max Weber's (1958) distinction that groups compete not only for economic standing (material resources), but also for status and prestige (cultural resources).

a city or community (Gusfield 1963; DiMaggio 1982; Beisel 1997). *Thus, I expect that large changes in the percentage of foreign-born residents in a city will lead to more conflict.*

Also, many of the conflicts in my sample take place over works deemed obscene and pornographic as well as those promoting homosexuality. In the wake of women's rights and the sexual liberation of the 1970s, and the rise of gay rights, AIDS and gay-themed television and film in the 1980s and 1990s, many link current conflicts over culture to conservative efforts to protect traditional family values (Hertz 1991; Gallagher 1996; Button 1997). In the absence of information about the sexual orientation of a city's residents, I can examine changes in the percentage of single-parent families, another flash point for conservatives who fear the breakdown of the traditional family. *Thus, I expect rapid changes in the percent of single-parentage families in a community to be related to higher levels of conflict over art and culture.*

When thinking about population change it is important to keep in mind that it is not absolute changes, but rather the perception of change that should be related to cultural conflict. In other words, conflict should arise when long-term residents are most aware of the new strangers in their midst. This is likely to be the case in communities that are less diverse to begin with. *Thus, I expect an interaction between the degree of population change and the extent to which a community is racially diverse or heterogeneous. Population changes should be more closely related to conflict in less heterogeneous cities.*

Finally, the above discussion assumes that conservative members of the community will initiate conflicts over art in an attempt to defend traditional values against encroaching liberal and secular lifestyles. However, aggregate analysis of all conflict events in my sample reveals that approximately twenty percent of all conflicts had a liberal valence involving challenges to cultural works deemed offensive to ethnic minorities, women or non-Christians. *Given this fact, I would expect that the influx of immigrants and single-parent families will be more strongly related to conservative-based conflicts than all conflicts taken as a whole.*

Ritual, Identity Politics and Liberal-based Conflicts over Art and Culture

Social change not only leads established groups to search for ways to affirm their own beliefs and behaviors, but it can also provide the impetus for new groups to make claims for recognition and broader public respect. According to Merton (1972), social change is often funneled through movements or rituals, which largely involve the public affirmation of the status

and collective identities of emerging groups. As cities become larger and more diverse, minority groups are more likely to achieve a critical mass that facilitates the formation of unique subcultures (Button 1997). As they grow in proportion to the rest of the population, such groups increasingly feel that they have the legitimacy and political efficacy to challenge the status quo culture. To quote Merton (1972), “when a once largely powerless collectivity acquires a socially validated sense of growing power, its members experience an intensified need for self-affirmation” (11). Such affirmation can be achieved through rituals, such as symbolic fights over art and culture, which legitimate and honor the status and identities of these new and growing groups. For example, as described by Rodriquez (1999), Mexican Americans, representing a growing ethnic group in San Jose, California, staged a symbolic protest against a town parade celebrating Spanish settlers to the area. Stephen Dubin (1992), in his book *Arresting Images*, describes several instances where identity politics were the root causes of conflicts over art. Dubin argues that as African Americans, Hispanics, gays and lesbians, and women emerge from the shadows of political and social life, they challenge cultural works in an effort to either obliterate residual symbols of racism or sexism or to simply make their voices heard and gain broader recognition (306).

Thus, conflicts driven by identity politics, like those with conservative valences, are related to the demographic compositions of communities. However, unlike the more typical conflicts associated with traditional members of the communities, these conflicts are more likely to take place in relatively heterogeneous cities, where minority groups are large enough to have both the organizational and emotional support necessary to stage a challenge. *This leads to my final proposition: liberal-based conflicts, or those more typically related to identity politics, will be more common in relatively large, heterogeneous cities.*

Results

To return to the first proposition, I expected that rapid changes in the percentage of foreign-born residents in a city will lead to more conflict over art and cultural expression. In Table 4.2, model 1, I find that the percent change in the proportion of foreign-born residents in a city was positively related to the number of conflicts over art and culture. This confirms the first proposition. Moreover, the relationship between changes in the foreign-born population and levels of conflict was independent of population size and the percentage of a city’s citizens who

have been to college.⁶ In other words, I do not find more conflict in larger cities simply because these places had more people, more art and more immigrants. While larger cities did, on average, have a greater number of conflicts than smaller cities, conflicts over art and culture were likely to erupt in those cities, both small and large, that were experiencing rapid changes in the number of new immigrants.

It is worth noting that the overall rate of growth of a community was not related to higher levels of conflict. When I include in the model the percentage change in the size of a city's population, I find no evidence to support the claim that all types of population growth lead to conflict (Table 4.2, model 2). Conflicts over art and culture in my sample were related to those population changes that resulted in greater ethnic diversity as new immigrants moved into metropolitan areas. Yet, places like Tacoma, WA; Norfolk, VA; Las Vegas, NV and West Palm Beach, FL experienced rapid population growth without major changes in the percentage of foreign-born immigrants. In these cases, population growth was high, but levels of conflict were relatively low (see Table 4.1). Growth alone did not lead to conflict. Rather, it was the growth of immigrant populations that seemed most closely related to incidences of conflict over art and cultural expression.

Additionally, because many conflicts over art and culture revolve around issues related to traditional family values, it was suggested earlier that rapid changes in the percentage of single-parent families in a community — perhaps the most direct threat to those values and beliefs associated with the core, two-parent family — would be related to higher levels of conflict. The findings bear this out. Table 4.2 model 3 shows that the percentage change in the proportion of single-parent families between 1980 and 1990 was positively related to a greater number of conflict events controlling for education, population size and racial heterogeneity.

The third proposition was that growth in the foreign-born population would have a bigger impact on those communities that were relatively less diverse to begin with. In other words, I predicted that there would be an interaction effect between changes in the percentage of foreign-born citizens and the racial heterogeneity of a city. When the sample is divided into cities with

⁶ When examining the effects of population changes on levels of conflict, I look at each independent variable — percent change in total population, percent change in percent foreign-born, and percent change in percent single-parent families — independently of the others. Thus, I examine three separate models rather than a single model with all variables included. I adopt this approach primarily for the sake of parsimony, to preserve degrees of freedom given a relatively small sample size. Additionally, the different categories of population change are highly correlated, introducing problems of multicollinearity when included together in the same model.

higher than average levels of heterogeneity (as measured by the Gibbs-Martin Index) and those with lower than average levels, I find, as expected, that changes in the foreign-born population were more strongly related to conflict levels in the former environment (Table 4.3). In fact, the positive impact of changes in percentage of foreign-born residents was four times larger in the sample of cities with low levels of heterogeneity compared to those cities with higher levels of heterogeneity. In other words, it was in relatively homogenous cities where people were most likely to challenge artistic and cultural expression in response to rapidly changing demographic conditions.

The fourth proposition was that changes in demographics — both percent foreign-born and percent single-parent families — would be more strongly related to the number of conservative-based conflicts than the number of conflicts overall (those that include conservative-based conflicts, liberal-based conflicts, and those that are neither conservative nor liberal). Again, conservative-based refers to those conflicts where the artwork is deemed obscene, pornographic, violent, vulgar or otherwise offensive to family values. Liberal-based conflicts are those initiated by groups who claim a presentation is offensive to ethnic and racial minorities, women and dissenting or non-Christian religions. Findings in Table 4.4 show that when we look only at conservative-based conflicts, both changes in the percent foreign-born (model 1) and the percent single-parent families (model 2) are no longer significantly related to the number of conflicts in a city. The negative effect of racial heterogeneity on conflict is now significant. In other words, cities with more racially diverse residents were less likely to fight over cultural works that offended traditional conservative sensibilities. This finding seems to indicate that diverse communities are more tolerant of nontraditional cultural practices and expression.

But, what explains the fact that those demographic changes (immigrants and single parents) that are positively related to the number of overall conflicts seem unrelated to the number of conservative-based conflicts when these events are examined separately? I will return to this question shortly, but suffice it to say at present that the population shifts discussed in this paper are related to a more complicated picture of conflict that involves fights over traditional values as well as liberal-based fights generated by new and emerging groups. It is this second category of conflict, discussed above as an outlet for identity politics, to which I now turn my attention.

The fifth proposition was that liberal-based conflicts, or those more typically related to identity politics, would be more common in relatively large, heterogeneous cities. Contrary to expectations, I find that racial heterogeneity was unrelated to the number of liberal-based conflicts in a city. Thus at first glance, identity politics, as measured by liberal-based grievances against cultural works, were no more strongly related to the number of conflicts in racially diverse cities than in those urban areas where minority groups were less numerous.

However, perhaps it is both the proportion of minority groups in a city as well as their overall number (e.g., critical mass) that are related to higher levels of liberal-based conflicts. Perhaps big cities with low to modest levels of heterogeneity still have a large enough critical mass of minority residents to achieve the organizational and emotional support necessary to stage a challenge against an offensive artwork. In smaller cities when racial diversity is low, minority groups might simply feel too vulnerable or outnumbered to launch a protest. To test this proposition — that racial diversity will be more closely linked to liberal-based conflicts in small cities than in large cities — I split the sample into big cities (those above the mean-sized city) and small cities (those below) and then examine the influence of heterogeneity on the number of liberal-based conflicts. Table 4.6 shows that racial heterogeneity is a strong predictor of liberal-based conflicts in small cities, but indicates no relationship to levels of conflict in larger cities.

To summarize my findings, rapid changes in the number of new, foreign-born residents and single-parent families were related to higher levels of conflict over art and cultural expression. Also, I found that there was an interesting interaction between racial heterogeneity and growth in the number of foreign-born residents. It is in the least diverse cities where rapid changes in the number of foreign-born residents spurred conflict most readily. The price-utility curve in microeconomic theory informs us that a dollar is worth more to a poor man than a rich man. It seems from this analysis that social change has more currency in a community that is poor in diversity than one that has a rich mix of people of different races and ethnic descent. Results also show that racial heterogeneity was related to lower levels of conservative-based conflicts. In relatively small cities, racial heterogeneity was associated with more liberal-based conflicts, perhaps as a result of grievances being linked to identity-based politics in these communities. However, contrary to expectations, when I examine only conflicts with

conservative-based grievances, I find that both types of demographic shifts (foreign-born and single parents) were no longer related to levels of conflict. What explains this puzzle?

There is no simple answer. However, if we examine the ranking of cities by 1) total number of conflict events per capita; and 2) total number of conservative-based conflicts per capita, we begin to find some clues (see Table 4.7).⁷ It appears that several cities with rapid changes in the number of foreign-born residents move down considerably in the rankings when examining conservative-based conflicts only (e.g., Phoenix, AZ; Raleigh, NC; Chicago, IL; San Francisco, CA; Albuquerque, NM; and Houston, TX). Of equal importance, several cities that have little growth in the foreign-born population — Dayton, OH; Cincinnati, OH; Tampa, FL; and Omaha, NE — rise significantly in the rankings when examining the subset of conservative events. These shifts attenuate the positive relationship between conflict levels and changes in foreign-born residents.

When we examine the profile of cities more closely — both demographics and the number and types of conflicts — it appears that there are four unique clusters. Phoenix, AZ; Nashville, TN; Charlotte, NC; Denver, CO; Atlanta⁸, GA; and Raleigh, NC had high levels of overall conflict, and these events tended to be distributed between those originating in liberal- and conservative-based grievances. These cities also had fairly high rates of growth in foreign-born residents and slightly more diverse populations than average. We might call these places “contentious” cities — with liberal and conservative groups both active in initiating conflicts over art and culture (see Sidebar 4.1). Thus, in these urban settings I found both identity politics and traditional values working side-by-side to generate conflicts over art and cultural expression.

Yet, those cities whose ranking rises dramatically when examining only conservative-based conflicts have a very different profile. Places like Dayton, Cincinnati, and Tampa tended to have few, if any, liberal-based conflicts. Almost all controversies revolved around challenges to traditional values — works of art and culture deemed obscene, blasphemous, vulgar or otherwise dangerous to families and children. Moreover, these cities had relatively homogenous populations with few new foreign-born residents. The profile of these places is one of cultural

⁷ Cities are ranked by conflicts per capita rather than total number of conflicts (the dependent variable in previous models), in order to control for population size, which is positively related to the number of conflicts in a city.

⁸ Atlanta was removed from the analysis because it was an outlier in terms of total number of conflict events. Atlanta had thirty-eight events, the next closest was Denver with twenty. However, it is important to note that Atlanta has an above average level of growth in foreign-born residents and a moderate level of racial diversity-conditions that predict high levels of conflict.

regulation rather than contention (see Sidebar 4.2). In other words, conservative and traditional groups seemed to dominate debates over art and culture in these cities, attempting to regulate and restrict expression that they find offensive or dangerous.

The third type of city is represented by places like Chicago, IL; San Francisco, CA; and Albuquerque, NM. These cities were highly diverse and typically had above average growth rates of foreign-born residents. They also had a disproportionate number of liberal-based conflicts. The profile here is one in which identity politics lies at the root of many of the conflicts over art and cultural expression (see Sidebar 4.3). Finally, there is a fourth class of cities that includes places like Evansville, IN; Springfield, IL; Des Moines, IA; Buffalo, NY; and Tacoma, WA. Like those cities represented by practices of cultural regulation, these places had relatively low levels of racial diversity and few foreign-born residents. However, in these communities, for whatever reason, neither conservative nor liberal groups were sufficiently provoked or mobilized to challenge works of art and cultural expression, and as a result, they had few conflicts over the study's four-year time span.⁹

Thus, when I subtract out the liberal-based events and look only at those with a conservative valence, in essence, I give more weight (in terms of ranking cities by number of conflict events) to those communities that specialize in cultural regulation. However, I give less weight to contentious cities — those that have both liberal and conservative-based conflicts — and to those cities specializing in identity politics (mostly liberal-based events). In addition, the dynamics of conflict in places where cultural regulation prevails was very different from the dynamics in the two other types of cities. In particular, demographic characteristics, like the racial diversity of residents and the growth of foreign-born populations, seem to play little, if any, role as sources of conflict. Instead, we might hypothesize that the strength of the religious community or the general conservative climate of opinion in places like Cincinnati or Dayton account for the disproportionate number of conservative-based controversies over art and culture.

⁹ It is quite possible that these cities, rather than being different from those cities identified for practices of *cultural regulation*, represent instead an extreme form of cultural regulation. That is, perhaps there were fewer conflicts because officials and administrators are successful at preventing potentially provocative art from ever being displayed in the community in the first place.

Conclusion

This paper builds upon earlier work on cultural conflict and examines the proposition that fights over art and cultural expression serve as “rituals of protest” initiated by dominant members of a community who feel that their lifestyle and values are being threatened by new and emerging groups (e.g., immigrants). In *Meaning and Moral Order* (1987), Robert Wuthnow discusses how, in times of social change, such rituals define boundaries, dramatize the moral obligations and behaviors of citizens, and communicate prevailing notions of how things “were, are and will be.” My findings provide mixed support for this thesis. On the one hand, there is evidence that population shifts were related to increased levels of controversy in a city. Many of these controversies were based in grievances that reflect conservative or traditional beliefs and values, as would be expected by the rituals-of-protest or status-anxiety explanations. On the other hand, when I examine only those conflicts that are linked to conservative-based grievances (removing all liberal-based and neutral grievances from the sample), it appears that cities with the greatest number of conservative-based grievances (controlling for population size and education levels) did not experience greater-than-average population changes. A provisional explanation for this discrepancy is that conservative-based grievances are motivated by two different social dynamics. It is quite possible that population changes lead to more conservative-based grievances. Yet, such changes also seem to accompany more liberal-based grievances as well (perhaps as new and emerging groups use arts conflicts as a means to assert their identities in times of flux). Thus, the most contentious cities typically experienced greater-than-average levels of population changes. In other cities (such as Omaha and Cincinnati), conservative-based grievances may have been less the result of population changes than of residents from fairly homogenous communities striking out against anything that violates community norms. These cities might also have been involved in “rituals of protest,” but the rituals were part of an ongoing effort to maintain and regulate the culture and values of the community (a process that seems to take place regardless of “real” threats imposed by a rapidly changing demographic base).

In the case of contentious cities, population shifts might have created conditions of uncertainty, which in turn provided an impetus for both traditional and emerging groups in a community to fight over cultural expression. In the other case, it appears that it was the lack of change and lack of diversity that was associated with conflict. In such places (what I have called

“cities of cultural regulation”), conflicts over art and culture may have served as a regular and ongoing form of cultural maintenance. Perhaps the notion of “rituals of protest” is more apt for these cases, as ritual tends to describe those activities that take place on a regular basis, as opposed to activities that are in direct response to some outside catalyst (such as population changes). Whereas in contentious cities, conflicts are perhaps not so much “rituals of protest” as they are flares of competition.

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Side Bar 4.1: Denver, Colorado: A Contentious City.

Denver presents a good example of what I have described in this chapter as a contentious city. Between 1995 and 1998 there were twenty conflicts over art and cultural expression, well above the average number of ten conflicts per city. Denver also experienced a robust increase (ten percent) in the number of new foreign-born residents between 1980 and 1990 as well as an above-average level of racial diversity.

By many accounts Denver is considered a progressive city. Since opening the first birth control clinic in Colorado in 1926, Denver has had very liberal policies with respect to abortion rights and other social policies. In a recent local survey a majority of today's residents indicated pro-choice sentiments (Sharp 1999). Denver was also the first city in Colorado to approve an ordinance in 1990 banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Politically, the city is also quite liberal, with residents electing both a Hispanic and Black mayor in the 1990s. Nonetheless, a strong vein of traditional, conservative values also runs through Denver and Colorado more generally. Less than sixty miles from Denver, in Colorado Springs, is the headquarters of Focus on the Family, one of the largest, national, religious right organizations in America. With support from Focus, a local group, Citizens for Sensible Rights, initiated a highly visible campaign to repeal Denver's nondiscrimination ordinance. The campaign evolved into a statewide battle over a ballot initiative that sought to amend the state constitution to prevent the passage of hate-crime laws protecting homosexuals. The initiative was ultimately successful.

Thus, Denver represents a city where both liberal and conservative groups have a fairly strong foothold. As I discuss in this paper, the most contentious cities, such as Denver, have a fairly large number of conflicts originating in both liberal- and conservative-based grievances. Eleven of the twenty conflicts in Denver were over art and cultural expression that was deemed pornographic, obscene, harmful to children, violent, or blasphemous. Religious fundamentalist groups participated in two of these conflicts — the first involved a protest against a Halloween night seminar featuring books about “pagan witches” at a local Barnes and Nobles book store. The store cancelled the event as a result of the protest. The second involved a complaint by a high school student from a fundamentalist Christian background who objected to the presentation of a science videotape that portrayed evolution as fact rather than theory. The school board removed the video from the curriculum and then reinstated it after outrage from community members and pressure from the American Civil Liberties Union. Despite opposition from a national conservative legal foundation, the video was allowed to remain in the schools.

There were also several fights over the presentation of R-rated films. Parents complained that the profanity, obscenity and violence in *Schindler's List*, the 1993 film about the Holocaust, contributed to the degradation of society and asked that it be banned from the schools. A complaint by a parent over Italian director Bernardo Bertolucci's classic film, *1900*, reached the State Supreme Court, after the school district fired the teacher who had shown the film to his class. Parents also attempted to ban two books from the curriculum — a book intended for fifth graders, *My Brother Sam is Dead*, which chronicles life during the American Revolution; and a book used in high school English classes, *Grendel* which is an adaptation of the epic poem, *Beowulf*. In both cases, parents objected to profanity, depictions of graphic violence, and rape. Finally, a state legislator representing a Denver district proposed a state law that would make it illegal to sell or exhibit “lascivious art.” The legislation, which was defeated, was motivated by the lawmaker's objection to photographer Sally Mann's *Immediate Family* and Jock Sturges', *Radiant Identities*. Both are books that contain artistic photographs of nude children.

On the other side, there were six conflicts with a liberal valence. The president of the local chapter of the American Jewish Committee wrote an open letter to Michael Jackson complaining about song lyrics that contained the expressions, “Jew me” and “Kike me.” In another case a state legislator from Denver, along with members of several

Native American tribes, asked officials to change a Civil War memorial that celebrates the battle of Sandcreek, where more than 200 Native Americans were massacred. A local radio-station owner led a demonstration over a painting in a gallery that depicted Mexican war hero, Emiliano Zapata, dressed in a white miniskirt and holding a straw broom and a box of laundry detergent. Finally, ethnic concerns surfaced in a debate over a sculpture commissioned for the State Capitol building intended to honor fallen firefighters. The artist, who was of Latino descent, created a design that featured several firefighters, each with Latino facial features, helping a Caucasian victim. A government committee rejected the design because the figures were not "ethnically neutral." The decision brought a storm of criticism from the artist, local citizens, and an association of black and Latino firefighters. The controversy reflected the uneasiness with which the city government, faced with a small but growing Latino population, approached ethnic issues — in this case, seeming uncomfortable with a sculpture that looked too "Latin." Meanwhile, representatives of the Latino community regarded the sculpture as an important affirmation of their positive role in the life of the city.

Side Bar 4.2: Dayton, Ohio: City of Cultural Regulation.

Dayton is a city that fits the description of cultural regulation. Dayton had a total of eleven conflicts over art and cultural expression between 1995 and 1998, slightly more than average given its population size. Dayton is not very racially diverse, with whites representing eighty-five percent of its residents, and with a score on the racial heterogeneity index that is well below average for the sample. The metropolitan area also has a fairly stable population, with virtually no growth in the foreign-born population between 1980 and 1990. Thus, unlike some of the most contentious cities in the sample, the conflicts in Dayton do not appear to stem from rapid population changes. Nor do they involve a mix of both liberal- and conservative-based grievances. Instead, ten of the eleven conflict events involved actors who claimed a cultural presentation was offensive to traditional values. Eight of the cases, or seventy-seven percent, involved actors who identified themselves with Christian causes or Christian organizations.

Perhaps the most visible case, certainly the most unusual, involved the owner of a local Catholic bookstore who, for more than a year, launched an anonymous campaign to vandalize books in local libraries that dealt with the topics of homosexuality or the United Nations. Referred to as the “unipooper” by the local police, his protest typically involved defecating on the reading material and then leaving a note behind that said he was the guardian of decency in the community. Of all the protest events in my study, this is perhaps the most unusual strategy used for making a case in support of decency. Several other cases involved leaders of local churches, including a letter to the editor from a local Lutheran pastor supporting the cause of employees at the county clerk’s office who complained about an exhibition of paintings, two of which they described as satanic (one depicted the skull of a cow with horns and the other included the “yin-yang” symbol, familiar in eastern religions). Another case involved an annual book burning ceremony sponsored by a local reverend and the Sprit of Life Christian Church. Two books in particular were singled out by this group as corrupting the community — *Daddy’s Roommate* and *Heather has Two Mommies* — which deals with challenges faced by children growing up in homosexual homes.

However, the most important source of conflict in the Dayton area came from several Christian Right organizations, including the locally based Christian Family Network and the Christian Life Coalition as well as the local chapter of the American Family Association. These groups launched a series of attacks on several popular films and television shows. They helped organize a boycott of local theaters that presented the film *Priest*, which they said was sacrilegious. They also led demonstrations, phone campaigns, and boycotts against area businesses that advertised on local stations during such television shows as *Roseanne* and *NYPD Blue*, and they circulated petitions seeking the removal of MTV channel from local cable offerings. Finally, members of these groups participated in the Southern Baptist boycott of Disney, as well as a demonstration during a local Disney sponsored Mickey Mouse parade. These groups have many members in the Dayton area and they work vigorously to involve these supporters in shaping the types of cultural offerings available in their community.

It is worth noting that while most of the challenges in Dayton involved works of commercial film and broadcasting, several involved exhibitions sponsored by local arts organizations and presented in government buildings or publicly accessible spaces like the YMCA. In both instances the offending cultural works were removed as soon as complaints were lodged. In the case of the painting of the cow’s skull and the “ying-yang” sculpture, the works were deemed offensive in spite of the fact that the local arts foundation that supported the presentation had clear policies that prohibited the exhibition of works with nudity or religious or political themes. In other words, there is clearly a conservative approach to the display of artworks in public places in Dayton. Nonetheless, even works that met the fairly strict criteria (no nudity, religion or politics) still managed to offend some local citizens, and authorities removed the questionable works immediately, with little objection from the arts community. Again, this suggests that conflict over art and culture in Dayton, a relatively homogenous city, tends to fit the

description of cultural regulation — citizens, often members of religiously based organizations, have attempted to control offensive cultural expression in the absence of strong objections or counter challenges from the arts community, ethnic minorities or other non-Christian groups.

Side Bar 4.3: Albuquerque, New Mexico: Cultural Conflict as Identity Politics.

The majority of conflicts over art and culture in Albuquerque, New Mexico are rooted in what I have referred to as identity politics: where diverse cultural groups promote or attack visible symbols in the community — such as artworks and monuments — in an effort to gain recognition for their group. As my findings in this paper demonstrate, such conflicts are most frequent in cities, like Albuquerque, with a high degree of ethnic diversity. In fact, in recognition of its diversity, the city has incorporated multiculturalism in a variety of public policies, and as a tourist destination, Albuquerque promotes its multiethnic background, touting its rich Pueblo traditions and Hispanic legacy. But this diversity is also a source of contention. In the 1990s Native Americans, Hispanics and Caucasian Americans clashed repeatedly over such issues as the ethnic background of the superintendent of public schools, the preservation of local Pueblo religious sites, and rules prohibiting Native American students from wearing native attire at graduation ceremonies. These conflicts spilled over into the area of art and culture as well, with seven of ten cultural conflicts during the years of my study connected to grievances against work deemed offensive to religious or ethnic minorities.

Perhaps the most striking example of an arts conflict with its roots in identity politics erupted in January 1998 and involved a fight over a proposed public sculpture honoring the Spanish explorer, Don Juan de Onate. The sculpture was commissioned by the city to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the founding of New Mexico and was to be placed in a local public park. Anticipating that the monument might become embroiled in symbolic politics, the city selected three artists, each representing one of the three major cultural groups in Albuquerque — Native Americans, Hispanics and Caucasian Americans — to work together on the design. The artists proposed a monument that would feature a fifteen-foot bronze figure of Don Juan de Onate, who was a Spanish general and the first governor of New Mexico. In addition, the work was to include a series of moccasins leading to and away from the figure of Onate — a symbol of the contributions of Indians before and after the arrival of the Spanish settlers.

In spite of the multiethnic team of artists and the complicated mix of symbolism in the final design, the proposed monument led to a protracted debate between Hispanics and Indians over how New Mexico's past should be remembered. The Native American community reacted vociferously to the proposed figure of Onate, who they say massacred Acoma Indians and in one raid, cut off the right feet of male members of the tribe. For this group the proposed sculpture dishonored their history and their contribution to the community. As one Native American representative said, "I feel that healing should come out of this monument. I don't need another fetish to injustice hung around our necks" (Reed 1998).

Yet, the Hispanic community felt that Native American advocates were seeking to change the meaning of the sculpture, which they felt should rightfully celebrate the Hispanic legacy in Albuquerque. A spokesperson for the anti-Hispanic Defamation League said, "Frankly, the Acoma Indians have no place in the memorial. After 400 years, the Spanish people should be able to stand up and say: 'It's our anniversary. I have made it'" (Reed 1998). The debate over the sculpture lasted more than three years and involved a series of public forums, conflict resolution workshops, and debate among members of the city council, the mayor and the local arts board. At the final public meeting, members of the city council voted on a compromise to keep the statue of Onate, but to place it in a less visible location in front of the city art museum. At this final meeting, a Hispanic told the

council, "If your family is of Spanish descent, this is a personal attack on you, your family and your heritage." A group of American Indians reacted to the final decision by praying silently in front of the city chamber; many of them wept openly (Potts 2000). In a city marked by a higher than average degree of ethnic diversity, this case highlights the role of identity politics in battles over art — with Hispanics and Native Americans vying with each other over whose symbols and whose history would dominate the public square in Albuquerque.

In another example of identity politics, the mayor of Albuquerque objected to a mural at the public library that he said contained an image that looked like a Spaniard stabbing a Mayan Indian. Concerned that the image would offend people of Native American descent, who might see it as a symbol of hatred, he demanded that the arts council take steps to paint over the offending portion of the painting. In another case the mayor, along with local Latino residents, criticized the design of a sculpture selected by the local arts board to serve as a gateway to Baretas, a Latino neighborhood in Albuquerque. The sculpture design, proposed by a Caucasian artist from Ohio, included three large abstract rings made of stone and steel. In response to the proposed design, one resident was quoted as saying, "It's my opinion that Hispanic history should be done by an Hispanic artist who understands Hispanic culture and history" (Nash 1999). Members of the community ultimately selected an alternate design that was created by a local Latino artist and included a representation of Latino railway workers and a woman crossing a river. Thus, the controversy reflected the efforts of a large and growing community of ethnic residents who demanded an artwork that would honor and celebrate their unique history and identity. In Albuquerque public artworks become rallying points around which ethnic minorities seek to legitimize their past and assert their future in the community.

In addition to ethnic diversity, Albuquerque also has a diverse religious community, with an especially strong Jewish population. In fact, the local Jewish Federation wielded enough political clout to convince the city to place a large sculpture in the downtown Civic Plaza to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust. The proposed sculpture generated objections from local veterans groups who felt that the work would be more appropriate in front of a synagogue or on private property. Some members of the Jewish community agreed, fearing that such a visible symbol of Judaism placed in a multicultural city like Albuquerque would engender resentment and anti-Semitism. Nonetheless, most Jews defended the monument, with the director of the Federation claiming that "it is very important for the memorial to be erected in a public place where many people will see it" (Asher 1998). This event represented a complex mix of identity politics: the Jewish community seeking public affirmation and recognition of its past; a Latino mayor supporting the campaign as a gesture of goodwill to an important constituency; local veterans opposing the memorial as "out of place" and "inappropriate" for Albuquerque's public square; a small minority of Jews seeking a less visible way to honor Holocaust victims and fearful of stoking resentment within such a diverse city; and, to top it off, a group of Arab Americans showing up at the dedication ceremony to protest the sculpture, claiming it wrong to honor Jewish victims when, they alleged, millions of Iraqi civilians have been killed because of U.S. foreign policy.

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for each MSA

City Name	Racial heterogeneity 1990	% change foreign-born	% change in population	% change single parent	# conflicts per capita (log)	# of conflicts (raw)
Albany	0.15	-0.11	0.04	0.19	0.51	7
Albuquerque	0.56	0.23	0.14	0.29	0.68	9
Allentown	0.14	-0.06	0.08	0.27	0.83	11
Anchorage	0.36	0.18	0.30	0.22	1.05	13
Austin	0.49	0.60	0.45	0.26	0.66	9
Baltimore	0.43	0.09	0.08	0.1	1.16	17
Baton Rouge	0.45	-0.02	0.07	0.3	0.53	7
Boston	0.25	0.16	0.03	0.09	0.8	12
Buffalo	0.24	-0.21	-0.04	0.23	0.36	5
Charleston	0.12	-0.10	-0.07	0.18	0.46	6
Charlotte	0.35	0.36	0.20	0.18	0.93	13
Chicago	0.51	0.15	0.02	0.09	0.82	13
Cincinnati	0.24	-0.03	0.04	0.3	0.91	13
Columbus	0.26	0.18	0.11	0.2	0.85	12
Dayton	0.26	-0.05	0.01	0.25	0.8	11
Denver	0.36	0.10	0.14	0.24	1.4	20
Des Moines	0.14	-0.05	0.07	0.24	0.23	3
Detroit	0.40	-0.15	-0.03	0.25	1.24	19
Evansville	0.13	-0.09	0.01	0.32	0.08	1
Fresno	0.60	0.66	0.31	0.39	0.74	10
Harrisburg	0.17	0.01	0.06	0.25	0.68	9
Houston	0.60	0.69	0.21	0.3	0.6	9
Kansas City	0.29	0.02	0.09	0.25	0.98	14
Las Vegas	0.38	0.22	0.62	0.21	0.59	8
Memphis	0.50	0.10	0.07	0.18	0.94	13
Minneapolis	0.16	0.06	0.16	0.27	1.02	15
Nashville	0.29	0.34	0.16	0.26	1.01	14
New Orleans	0.53	0.15	-0.01	0.3	0.64	9
Norfolk	0.47	0.08	0.20	0.02	0.21	3
Oklahoma City	0.35	0.24	0.11	0.28	0.65	9
Omaha	0.22	-0.14	0.06	0.23	0.67	9
Phoenix	0.39	0.34	0.40	0.33	1.09	16
Providence	0.18	0.04	0.05	0.19	0.65	9
Raleigh	0.41	0.68	0.29	0.13	1.32	18
Riverside	0.53	0.61	0.66	0.14	0.95	14
Roanoke	0.24	0.48	0.02	0.16	0.32	4
Sacramento	0.43	0.32	0.36	0.16	0.71	10
Salt Lake City	0.18	-0.04	0.18	0.3	0.94	13
San Diego	0.52	0.36	0.34	0.06	0.95	14
San Francisco	0.60	0.27	0.08	-0.07	0.63	9
Santa Rosa	0.27	0.27	0.30	0.05	0.93	12
Seattle	0.26	0.13	0.23	0.1	1.03	15
Springfield, IL	0.17	-0.25	0.01	0.33	0.08	1
Tacoma	0.29	-0.05	0.21	0.23	0.38	5
Tampa	0.29	0.05	0.28	0.17	0.89	13
West Palm Beach	0.35	0.21	0.50	0.15	0.37	5
Sample Average	0.34	0.15	.016	0.21	0.75	10.5

Table 4.2: Number of conflict events regressed on population changes

	Unstandardized Coefficients/ Std. Error		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Constant)	-35.3** (8.9)	-35.4** (8.9)	-43.3** (10.0)
Population size (logged)	2.8** (.64)	2.7** (.68)	2.9** (.67)
Percent with some college education	14.7* (6.6)	15.7* (7.1)	20.9** (6.9)
Racial heterogeneity in 1990	-6.9 (4.6)	-2.3 (4.0)	-1.2 (3.7)
% change in percent foreign-born	5.3* (2.6)		
% change in size of population		.025 (.033)	
% change in percent single parenthood			10.0 [†] (5.6)
Sample size (N)	46	46	46

Dependent variable: Total number of conflict events that were more than sparks

** = $p \leq .01$

* = $p \leq .05$

† = $p \leq .1$

Table 4.3: Number of conflict events regressed on percent change in % foreign born, for both cities with low and high levels of racial heterogeneity.

Coefficients^a

Racial heterogeneity -- dichotomous		Unstandardized Coefficients			
		B	Std. Error	t	Sig.
Low Racial Heterogeneity	(Constant)	-48.686	8.895	-5.473	.000
	Population size (logged)	3.870	.682	5.672	.000
	Percent with some college education	7.836	6.910	1.134	.271
	% Change in Percent Immigrants	7.717	2.958	2.609	.017
High Racial Heterogeneity	(Constant)	-15.021	16.909	-.888	.385
	Population size (logged)	1.227	1.049	1.169	.257
	Percent with some college education	14.029	12.023	1.167	.258
	% Change in Percent Immigrants	1.502	3.469	.433	.670

a. Dependent Variable: Total number of conflict events that were more than sparks.
N=46, or 23 observations for each in the split sample.

Table 4.4: Number of conservative-based conflict events regressed on percent change in foreign born, percent change in single parent families and racial heterogeneity.

	Unstandardized Coefficients/ Std. Error	
	Model 1	Model 2
(constant)	-13.0 [†] (7.4)	-16.3* (8.2)
Population size (logged)	1.32** (.54)	1.37** (.55)
Percent with some college education	6.11 (5.5)	8.69 (5.7)
Racial heterogeneity in 1990	-6.90 [†] (3.8)	-4.41 (3.1)
% change in percent foreign-born	2.31 (2.2)	
% change in percent single parenthood		4.06 (4.6)
Sample size (N)	46	46

Dependent variable: Total number of conservative-based conflict events

** = $p \leq .01$

* = $p \leq .05$

[†] = $p \leq .1$

Table 4.5: Number of liberal-based conflicts regressed on racial heterogeneity

		Coefficients ^a			
		Unstandardized Coefficients			
Model		B	Std. Error	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	-18.932	5.048	-3.750	.001
	Population size (logged)	1.353	.367	3.687	.001
	Percent with some college education	3.849	3.727	1.033	.308
	racial heterogeneity in 1990	1.849	2.086	.886	.380

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Liberal-based Conflicts

Table 4.6: Number of liberal-based conflicts regressed on racial heterogeneity, for both big and small cities (split sample).

Coefficients^a

Log of population-- dichotomy	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
			B	Std. Error		
City size is below the mean	1	(Constant)	.307	1.524	.202	.842
		Percent with some college education	-1.369	3.385	-.404	.690
		racial heterogeneity(1990)	6.097	1.793	3.401	.003
City size is above the mean	1	(Constant)	-1.163	4.051	-.287	.777
		Percent with some college education	6.992	7.675	.911	.373
		racial heterogeneity(1990)	2.183	3.918	.557	.584

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Libera-based Conflicts

Table 4.7: Comparing city rankings by total number of conflicts and total number of conservative-based conflicts only.*

MSA Name	Total # of conflict events	Total # of conservative-based conflicts	% Change in percent foreign born	Ranking by total # of conflicts	Ranking by total # of conservative-based events	Change in ranking (column4 – column5)
Denver, CO	20	11	0.10	1	3	-2
Raleigh, NC	18	8	0.68	2	14	-12
Detroit, MI	19	7	-0.15	3	24	-21
Baltimore, MD	17	7	0.09	4	23	-19
Phoenix, AZ	16	6	0.34	5	29	-24
Anchorage, AK	13	10	0.18	6	1	5
Seattle, WA	15	10	0.13	7	6	1
Minneapolis, MN	15	9	0.06	8	12	-4
Nashville, TN	14	9	0.34	9	8	1
Kansas City, MO	14	10	0.02	10	5	5
San Diego, CA	14	8	0.36	11	18	-7
Riverside, CA	14	10	0.61	12	7	5
Memphis, TN	13	9	0.10	13	9	4
Salt Lake City, UT	13	6	-0.04	14	26	-12
Santa Rosa, CA	12	7	0.27	15	17	-2
Charlotte, NC	13	8	0.36	16	15	1
Cincinnati, OH	13	11	-0.03	17	2	15
Tampa, FL	13	9	0.05	18	11	7
Columbus, OH	12	8	0.18	19	16	3
Allentown, PA	11	7	-0.06	20	20	0
Chicago, IL	13	4	0.15	21	37	-16
Boston, MA	12	6	0.16	22	30	-8
Dayton, OH	11	10	-0.05	23	4	19

City Name	Total # of conflict events	Total # of conservative-based conflicts	% Change in percent foreign born	Ranking by total # of conflicts	Ranking by total # of conservative-based events	Change in ranking (column4 – column 5)
Fresno, CA	10	5	0.66	24	32	-8
Sacramento, CA	10	9	0.32	25	10	15
Harrisburg, PA	9	7	0.01	26	19	7
Albuquerque, NM	9	2	0.23	27	43	-16
Omaha, NE	9	8	-0.14	28	13	15
Austin, TX	9	7	0.60	29	21	8
Oklahoma City, OK	9	7	0.24	30	22	8
Providence, MA	9	6	0.04	31	27	4
New Orleans, LA	9	6	0.15	32	28	4
San Francisco, CA	9	2	0.27	33	44	-11
Houston, TX	9	3	0.69	34	42	-8
Las Vegas, NV	8	5	0.22	35	33	2
Baton Rouge, LA	7	6	-0.02	36	25	11
Albany, NY	7	5	-0.11	37	34	3
Charleston, SC	6	5	-0.10	38	31	7
Tacoma, WA	5	3	-0.05	39	40	-1
West Palm Beach, FL	5	4	0.21	40	35	5
Buffalo, NY	5	4	-0.21	41	36	5
Roanoke, VA	4	3	0.48	42	38	4
Des Moines, IA	3	3	-0.05	43	39	4
Norfolk, VA-	3	3	0.08	44	41	3
Springfield, IL	1	1	-0.25	45	45	0
Evansville, IN	1	1	-0.09	46	46	0

*Rankings are calculated based on conflicts per capita (logged) in order to control for population size, which I know from other models is positively associated with the number of conflicts.